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NOTES
RIGHT OF PRIVACY vs. FREE PRESS:
SUGGESTED RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTING VALUES
Reconciliation of freedom of the press and the right to privacy
has evolved hesitantly in an atmosphere of confusion.' These two
interests, inherent in a democracy, clash repeatedly upon publication
of a person's name, history, or likeness. Preservation of individual
liberties is of prime importance in a democracy; yet continuance of
that democracy necessitates a press which provides sufficient informa-
tion upon which to base rational self-rule. This conflict, awareness
of which was evidenced even in the original writing on the subject,2
deserves continuous close scrutiny so that a reasonable balance may
be achieved.
The tremendous increase in facilities capable of transmitting in-
formation created the necessity for legal recognition of an individual's
right to be let alone. Coupled with rather devious ethical standards
of those in command of such publishing means,3 this expansion resulted
in use of a person's likeness, name, or history, with utter disregard for
his desire to avoid the "public eye." Presently, growth of the press
continues with the advent of nation wide television as a full fledged
partner of the book, radio, newspaper, leaflet, motion picture and
magazine.4
Meanwhile, the right to privacy has become firmly established in
almost all jurisdictions.5 The gist of an action for an invasion of
1. See Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32
MINN. L. REv. 734, 743 (1948).
2. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890).
3. Id. at 196.
4. HOCKING, FREEDoM OF THE PREss: A FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLE 162 (1947).
5. One jurisdiction remains unequivocally adverse to recognition, on any basis,
by continued reliance on an old case, Henry v. Cherry and Webb, 30 R..L 13, 73 Atl.
97 (1909). Other states, including Washington and Massachusetts, have been able to
avoid ruling on this point. See Marek v. Zarol Products Co., 298 Mass. 1, 9 N.E.2d
393 (1937); Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267, 177
P.2d 896 (1947). For a detailed account of the jurisdictions that recognize the right
and the basis on which such recognition is afforded see Feinberg, Recent Developments
in the Law of Privacy, 48 COL. L. REV. 713 (1948); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39
MICH. L. REv. 526 (1941); Notes, 20 Ky. L.J. 184 (1932); 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 383
(1948-49); 4 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 342 (1936-37); 15 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 931 (1947-48).
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privacy is the emotional disturbance produced by unreasonable inter-
ference with one's peace of mind. The action is distinguishable from
defamation which stresses the effect of a publication upon the outlook
of others. Four considerations are generally thought to be relevant
in determining the existence of an invasion in the particular case:6
(1) extent of use, which merely means that the plaintiff must have
been sufficiently identified by the name or likeness employed ;7 (2) seri-
ousness of the invasion, which entails evaluation of the degree of
embarrassment or discomfort that the challenged publication would
arouse in a person of ordinary sensibilities; (3) ends served by the
publication, which encompasses the free press limitation of assuring
an adequately informed public; (4) medium of publication, which
unfortunately remains a determinative element in many cases. The last
factor is misleading, and may be eliminated by a more realistic view
as to the scope of a free press.
Although the conflict between the right to privacy and freedom of
the press has been frequently recognized, 8 support is not lacking for
the contention that it is a false issue. 9 Of course, freedom of the
press is not an absolute;1O it may be and is qualified by the law of
libel.'- Where recovery is allowed in a privacy action, press freedom
has likewise been limited. Yet freedom of the press was early sug-
gested as a basis for denying the very existence of any right to
privacy ;12 however, this position assumes the exact question under
consideration, does the First Amendment protect the publication in
question?
6. See Ludwig, supra note 1, at 738; cf. Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 239 P.2d 630
(Calif. 1952).
7. Krieger v. Popular Publications, 167 N.Y. Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct
1938) (use of last name 100 times was actionable); Damron v. Doubleday, Doran &
Co., 133 N.Y. Misc. 302, 231 N.Y. Supp. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (single use of plaintiff's
name in a novel held not sufficient). The number of times the name is employed is
not the sole criterion for determining existence of a sufficiently clear identification.
For a discussion of this point see Nebb v. Bell Syndicate, 41 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y.
1941); Swacker v. Wright, 154 N.Y. Misc. 822, 277 N.Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
8. Gill v. Curtis, 239 P.2d 630 (Calif. 1952); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162
N.Y. Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937); State v. Evjue, 253 Wisc. 146,
33 N.W.2d 305 (1948).
9. Note, 8 Mo. L. Ruv. 74 (1943). Reliance for this proposition is placed upon
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
10. HocKING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 66.
11. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 N.Y. Misc. 776, 781, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382, 388
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
12. Corliss v. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
NOTES
Freedom of press includes two inseparable elements, the right of
the publisher to publish and the right of the people to an adequate
press.13 The clash of the privacy doctrine with freedom of the press
focuses attention on the latter aspect of the concept, for if a publica-
tion is privileged, it is because it contributes material which enables
the public to be well informed. Responsible self-government depends
upon a well versed public.;14 an adequate press will furnish to the
reader the facts, thoughts, and feelings of the world in order that he
may be a cognizant, reflective citizen. In recognition of this basic
need,"" the courts, almost without exception, hold that a publication is
privileged if it embraces "news, education, or information."',, More
finely drawn distinctions are discovered in such phrases as "general
concern,"' 7 "current news,' 8 "legitimate news,"' 9 "current interest" 20
13. In the report of the respected Commission on Freedom of the Press, Hocking
points out that: "Inseparable from the right of the press to be free has been the right
of the people to have a free press. But the public interest -has advanced beyond that
point; it is now the right of the people to have an adequate press. . . .The freedom
of the publisher to publish becomes responsible to a specific public goal. The editors
do not thereby lose their primary liberty to write and publish whatever they think;
they may lose the liberty, if it is such, to fail in the task of connecting the minds of
their readers with the going currents of fact, thought, and feeling in the world of
their membership." HOCKING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 169, 170.
14. The necessity of keeping the public informed is emphasized by Thomas Jef-
ferson's statement that: "The basis of our governments being the opinion of the
people, the very first object should be to keep that right. The way to prevent (errors
of] the people, is to give them full information of their affairs through the channel of
the public papers, and to contrive that these papers should penetrate the whole mass
of the people." Quoted in LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIvIDUAL FREEDoi
62 (1950). See also, LiPPMAN, LIBERTY AND THE NEws 54 (1920), where it is stated:
"Men who have lost their grip upon the relevant facts of their environment are the
inevitable victims of agitation and propaganda. The quack, the charlatan, the jingo,
and the terrorist can flourish only where the audience is deprived of independent access
to information."
15. In considering the value of keeping the channels for information open Justice
Shientag wrote: "A free press is so intimately bound up with fundamental democratic
institutions that, if the right of privacy is to be extended to cover news items and
articles of general public interest, educational and informative in character, it should
be the result of a clear expression of legislative policy." Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc.,
162 N.Y. Misc. 776, 781, 295 N.Y. Supp. 383, 388 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
16. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Gill v.
Curtis Pub. Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Calif. 1952); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App.
Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1st Dept. 1951).
17. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App.2d 304, 310, 95 P.2d 491, 496
(1939).
18. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, and Heath," 188 N.Y. Misc. 479, 483, 68 N.Y.
S.2d 779, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
19. Berg v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 959 (D. Minn.
1948).
20. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 N.Y Misc. 776, 782, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382, 388
(Sup. Ct 1937).
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and various other mixed classifications,2 1 but they are of dubious
analytical assistance.
Assuming that published material falls within the above trichotomy,
the present day method of determining a legally actionable invasion
involves weighing the value to be derived from the information against
the degree and character of the intrusion.22 Historically, this weighing
process has had a checkered development. Initially the public figure-
waiver concept was utilized.23  Under this view, an individual waived
his right to privacy by becoming a public person, often a public official. 24
The superficiality of this doctrine was illustrated by a California case
holding that a woman who jumped from the twelfth floor of an office
building had thereby waived her right of privacy. 25 Although this
test was long utilized, it is now generally recognized as inadequate. 20
21. For additional terms of similar nature see Note, 37 CORNFLL L.Q. 502, 504
(1952).
22. Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Gill v. Curtis Pub.
Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Calif. 1952); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, and Heath, 188 N.Y.
Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
23. In Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911), the court
ruled that consent could be implied as well as express, and if one engages in public
affairs, he consents by implication to publicity. In an unreported case it was held not
actionable to take a photo of a bubble dancer because she had waived her right to
privacy by her actions. See Time, Nov. 14, 1938, p. 34.
24. The court in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190,
200, 50 S.E. 68, 72 (1905) declared: "One who holds public office makes a waiver of
a similar character-that is, that his life may be subjected at all times to the closest
scrutiny in order to determine whether the rights of the public are safe in his hands."
A federal court declared that "[a] statesman, author, artist, or inventor, who asks for
and desires public recognition may be said to have surrendered this right to the public."
Corliss v. Walker Co., 64 Fed. 280, 282 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
The basis for this concept probably stemmed from the earliest writing on the sub-
ject, where it was stated that persons seeking public office "have renounced the right
to live their lives screened from public observation." Warren and Brandeis, supra
note 2, at 215.
25. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App.2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
The court ruled that she had not only waived her right to privacy, but the right to
privacy of her husband as well.
The absurd effects of this concept were further evidenced in O'Brien v. Pabst
Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941). O'Brien sued for use of his picture with a calen-
dar advertising beer. The plaintiff was on the All-American football team and was
also a member of a youth group which opposed alcoholic beverages. The court de-
clared there was no invasion because "[t]he publicity he got was only that which he
had been constantly seeking and receiving" as an All-American. Id. at 170.
Another example of overzealous protection afforded to a publication by utilization
of this test is to be found in Martin v. F.I.Y. Theatre Co., 10 Ohio Op. 338 (1938).
26. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) ; see Nizer, supra note 5, at
556. Such failure could be expected from a notion which failed to consider the
problems involved and thereby unnecessarily foreclosed publication of some material
while extending too zealous protection to others.
NOTES
Implicit in the public interest test, employed by some courts, is
the perception that the focus of judicial attention should be directed
toward the effect of the publication upon the public rather than upon
the individual's supposed intention to waive his right to privacy.2 7
This view primarily considered the content and character of the pub-
lication, attributing little weight to the individual's position. Never-
theless, definition of the term "public interest" was not without con-
fusion, typical ones being, "[t]hat indefinable quality of interest which
attracts attention,"28 or "[p]ublic interest will vary with the circum-
stances involved." 29 The weakness of such a one-sided test is apparent
since public interest may attach to a publication in the sense that many
persons are eager to read it, but it does not necessarily follow that the
publication will serve a public interest outweighing the individual distress
incurred.3 0
Recent adoption of the mores or public decency test l offers
hope for improvement in resolution of the basic issues involved. "Public
interest," or the end served by the publication is not discarded; it
remains as a factor-but not the only factor-in determining the result.
Cases in this area should, realistically, involve a balancing of the interests
by placing on the scales opposite the public interest, the degree and
character of invasion incurred by the plaintiff. Judicial expression of
this concept is typically phrased in terms of whether the publication in
question is repugnant to the social conscience at that time and place.3 2
However, an evaluation of the character and degree of the invasion
does not present the most difficult aspect of the balancing process. 33
27. See Nizer, supra note 5, at 556.
28. Associated Press v. International News Service, 248 U.S. 215, 219 (1918).
Quoted in Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App.2d 304, 309, 95 P.2d 491, 495(1939). The Metter decision noted, however, that such public interest is not to be con-
fused with mere curiosity.
29. Sweenek v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746, (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (fat woman ex-
ercising).
30. See Note, 74 N.Y.L. Rav. 423 (1940).
31. Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Gill v. Curtis Pub.
Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Calif. 1952); Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, and Heath, 188 N.Y.
Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
32. Sidis v. F-R. Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
33. This is readily illustrated by comparing Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285,
297 Pac. 91 (1931), where the past life of a reformed prostitute was exposed, with
Almind v. Sea Beach Ry., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N.Y. Supp. 842 (2d Dept. 1913),
which involved a photo of a woman itsed to demonstrate the safest way to board a
street car. Certainly the former case presents the greater and more embarrassing inva-
sion. Assuming that other factors are equal, clearly the prostitute would deserve re-
covery before the women boarding the street car. The court, therefore, when con-
fronted with an individual case, can make a reasonably accurate determination of the
degree and character of the invasion by reference to common decency.
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Impeding satisfactory implementation of the mores test is lack of a
realistic determination of the weight to be placed on the other end
of the scale. How much public interest is satisfied by the publication?
Stated another way, which publications require protection because of
the necessity of furnishing an adequate press to the consumer? Whether
the material is of legitimate public interest is continuously resolved by
stating that it must be news, educational or informational. The question
remains, however, what will fulfill the requirement that material be
news, educational or informational? Decisions and comments reflect
the haziness of the thinking in the attempt to imbue these words with
rational content. Compounding this confusion are decisions based
largely upon preconceived ideas concerning the medium of publication.
Ii
Among the irrelevant elements which enter into the cases with
persistent decisiveness is the fact-fiction dichotomy. The decision ren-
dered in Binn v. Vitagraph Co.,34 which involved a motion picture
portrayal of a sea rescue, has been construed to stand for the proposi-
tion that matters of fact are privileged, 35 while fictional material is
not. 6 This distinction rapidly became established as a basic element
in the law of privacy, despite its incorrect assumption that all matter
which is not absolutely factual is of no value to a rational public.3 7
Even Warren and Brandeis in the earliest legal writing on the right
to privacy gave some indication that the truth or falsity of material
34. 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
35. The fact-fiction distinction is in itself, inaccurately stated. Obviously all fac-
tual material will not be privileged. This suggests that if the material is factual it will
merit consideration of privilege, by weighing the value of the publication against the
character and degree of harm incurred by the individual. Likewise, if material is
fictional, the possibility of a balancing process is thereby foreclosed. Henceforth the
word privilege will denote that the publication merits consideration of possible non-
liability by weighing its public value against the harm to the individual.
36. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y. Supp. 752
(lst Dept. 1919). Plaintiff attorney found the solution to a murder. Defendant's
newsreel was filmed during the actual search for corpus delicti. Recovery denied. The
court distinguished the case from the Binn decision because this newsreel was taken on
the actual scene, and could thereby be termed factual. The Bint case, in contrast, was
produced in the studio and could be termed fictional.
37. The inaccuracy of such an assumption is suggested in Hannegan v. Esquire,
327 U.S. 146, 157-158 (1945), where the court in a case concerning free press and mail
classification stated: "What is good literature, what has educational value, what is
refined public information, what is good art, varies with individuals as it does from
one generation to another. . . . From the multitude of competing offerings the public
will pick and choose. What seems to one to be trash may have for others fleeting or
even enduring values."
NOTES
should not necessarily determine whether the publication should be
privileged. 38
The use of the stereotyped fact-fiction distinction necessitates
judicial dodging to avoid its apparent fallacy where the publication
obviously serves to enlighten consumers3 9 Accordingly, "mere un-
truths"40 are not necessarily considered fiction. Perhaps matter denomi-
nated fictional will violate the right of privacy more often than that
which is factual, but even an elementary understanding of the learn-
ing process should indicate that other considerations concerning the
nature of the publication must control. In Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne
and Heath41 the court forthrightly acknowledged that factually inac-
curate statements in a biography do not reduce its educational value.
Resolution of a similar problem by the Supreme Court of the United
States disclosed an even sounder approach with regard to the type of
publication which warrants constitutional protection. In rejecting a con-
tention to the effect that the constitutional guarantee of a free press
extends only to the exposition of ideas, the Court stated: "The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the pro-
tection of the basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of
propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine." 42
Nevertheless, the case law continues to reflect the unwillingness of
tribunals to apply this understanding in the privacy area.43 Although
the "news, educational, informational" criteria is a judicial creation,
the courts repeatedly display an inability to realize that a well-versed
public requires not only news, but material emanating from other modes
of expression such as the historical novel, travel stories, plays and tales
of famous persons. A superficial approach is also mirrored by writers
on the subject: "The question to be decided before the fact-fiction
38. Warren and Brandeis, sapra note 2, at 218.
39. Garner v. Triangle Pub. Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
40. Id. at 549.
41. 188 N.Y. Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1947). The biography of the
famous musician Koussevitzky contained minor untruths about his private life which
in the words of the court contained "no so-called revelations of any intimate details
which would tend to outrage public tolerance. There is nothing repugnant to one's
sense of decency or that takes the book out of the realm of legitimate dissemination of
information on a subject of general interest." Id. at 784.
The above quote constitutes the most clarified enunciation of the mores test to be
found in case materials. The first part refers to the degree of individual harm, while
the latter portion recognizes the aspect of public interest.
42. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
43. Donahue v. Warner Bros., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952).
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test can be applied is necessarily-is the publication a matter of news
interest to the public ?"'4  Assuming the publication is of admitted
news interest, it evidently would follow that if fiction the article would
not be privileged. Such a restricted view, while shielding the individual,
certainly does not satisfy the necessity for presenting to the consumer,
not only columns of facts and figures, but also the thoughtful reflection
and interpretation by others on a subject, event or person.45
Assuredly constitutional protection should not be mechanically ac-
corded either all fictional or all factual material. A potentially suitable
status for the fictional element within the mores test has been cautiously
suggested. "If the facts were enlarged upon so as to go beyond the bounds
of decency or propriety they should not be shielded. ' 46 Simply stated, the
proposed analysis constitutes no more than the customary weighing of
the interests involved, i.e., the degree of the invasion as opposed to
the benefit derived, denying special consideration to the verity of the
publication.4 7  Accordingly, an actionable invasion of privacy should
not be attributable to even a highly imaginative fabrication unless, as
could similarly be the case with strictly factual accounts, the material
is of no value, or the value to the public is outweighed by serious harm
to the individual.
Apperception that privacy is not legally invaded by such fictional
publications has been unfortunately limited largely to those appearing
in newspapers. 48 It has been cogently pointed out that in publishing
articles of diverse types, including fiction, "[t]he press exercises a
definite educational function, for, in supplying an assumed demand, it
affects the level of public interest for better or for worse."'49  Signifi-
44. Note, 20 FORD L. REV. 100, 102 (1951).
45. The value of such fictional material is voiced in the writings of commentators
on the historical novel. "An historical study, though in the form of fiction, may have
a positive value as a contribution to knowledge." In the words of William Thackeray:
"I take up a volume of Dr. Smollett or a volume of the Spectator, and say the fiction
carries a greater amount of truth in solution than the volume which purports to be all
true." Henry Seidel Canby wrote: "Sir Walter Scott is dead. Long live Sir Walter
Scott! His great discovery that fiction and history are interchangeable is a basic
patent, bound to reappear and reappear in the history of literature." Quoted from
Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 F.2d 6, 20 (10th Cir. 1952) (dissent).
46. Garner v. Triangle Publications Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
47. Cf. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne, and Heath, 188 N.Y. Misc. 479, 485, 68
N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
48. See note 72 infra, and accompanying text.
49. HOCKING,. op. cit. supra note 4, at 167. The author had previously stated:
"The typical news medium of today is a magazine in the original sense--a department
store; there is entertainment, criticism of art and music, directory to the passing show,
advertising lure and market report .... Mingling with this floating gazetteer of cur-
rent culture and its personnel there is Fictional Bait .... In all this the Mind of Time
NOTES
cantly, the word "press" as here utilized explicitly includes not only
the newspaper, but also book, magazine, radio, motion picture, and tele-
vision;50 yet similar privilege is not accorded fictionalized material pub-
lished therein. While much fiction appearing in newspapers should not
involve legal liability, many undeserving articles are also afforded the
blanket protection granted the newspaper. 51 Hence, extension of the
privilege evidently stems from the magic word "news" in newspaper
and suggests that it is not accorded on the merits of the particular
article, but on the basis of the medium in which it found expression.
The foregoing discussion manifests the obvious lacuna in the First
Amendment protection accorded fiction which allegedly invades the
right of privacy; only judicial abolition of the irrational fact-fiction
dichotomy can elevate this area of the law to accord with democratic
tradition.
III
In addition to a distinct lack of appreciation for the value of
fiction, the courts constantly voice adherence to the proposition that
news, educational or informational material should be privileged,5 2
but nevertheless refuse to consider the content of a factually informa-
tive or educational article as equal in significance to so-called news. 53
is being exhibited to Each Mind for such smorgasbord as suits him; as the spiritual
aura of the news, it is all news. It is information and the value scheme which enwraps
information"' Id. at 166-167.
50. Id. at 162.
51. See notes 73-74 infra, and accompanying text.
52. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952) ; Gill v.
Curtis Pub. Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Calif. 1952); Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 278 App.
Div. 431, 106 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dept. 1951); Lahiri v. Daily Mirror Inc., 162 N.Y.
Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
53. A striking instance of the general unwillingness to afford privilege to patently
educational matter is the recent case of Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d
974 (3d Cir. 1951). A ten-year-old child closely missed being struck by a car, and was
photographed as she was lifted to her feet. In addition to publication in the next day's
newspaper, the picture also appeared twenty months later in an article concerning
traffic accidents in the Saturday Evening Post. The court held the picture in the news-
paper, but not that in the magazine article, privileged. The decision ostensibly relied
on the allegation of the plaintiff that the article imputed an indeterminate degree of
negligence to the plaintiff. The opinion indicates, however, that privilege would not
have been afforded even if there had been no negligence question in the case. See
Note, 40 Gzo. 1.J. 478 (1952).
The length of time that has elapsed between the original publication and a later
one on the same or connected subject was at first thought to be of significance in
determining whether the second publication merited privilege. This factor was ex-
plicitly not the basis of the Leverton decision. The first notable case to clarify this
time element was Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940). This
famous case concerned a child prodigy who had received extensive publicity as a child,
but had become secluded in later life. Twenty-five years after the child's early fame,
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Accounts of "current happenings" are said to be of immediate im-
portance and concern to the public, while informational and educational
articles are of but "general interest. ' ' 54 Presumably, this means greater
protection should be afforded to reports of happenings of the last
twenty-four or forty-eight hours than to a thoughtful presentation of
a particular phase of life, employing as illustrative matter actual occur-
rences which are clearly true but are some weeks, months or even
years old. Realization of the proper function of the press in a free
society manifests the obvious fallacy of so narrow an approach. 55
Basic to the judicial deference accorded news stories is the
realization that it is an impossible task to obtain consent to print a
news report within the few hours between act and publication. 6 Un-
doubtedly an attempt could be made in most publications of an educa-
tional or informative nature to obtain consent, yet consent, like waiver,
is an irrelevant consideration if the article is of educational import.
Demonstrative of judicial dubiosity in scrutinizing alleged educa-
tional material are four of the five fact situations which follow. Public
exhibition for pornographic purposes of motion pictures of a caesarian
operation, after the woman had granted permission to have them
shown in medical societies, was held an invasion."' In Barber v. Tinte,
a woman suffering a disease causing obesity, recovered for publication
an article concerning the entire life of Sidis appeared. Recovery was denied, the court
holding the years elapsed were in themselves no bar to non-liability. Further illustra-
tion of this point is shown by contrasting Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845
(N.D. Calif. 1939) where plaintiff recovered for an invasion sixteen months after the
original publication was held privileged, with Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 256, 37 So.2d 118
(1948), where recovery was denied after sixteen years. See Note, 38 VA. L. REv. 117
(1952).
54. Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 502, 504 (1952).
55. One case, fifteen years old, stands out as a satisfactory realization of the
proper status of factual informational and educational material, but has not been ac-
corded sufficient emphasis. The court, after stating that a free press problem was
intimately involved, continued: "Newspapers publish articles which are neither strictly
news nor strictly fictional in character. They are not responses to an event of pecu-
liarly immediate interest but, though based on fact, are used to satisfy an ever present
educational need. . . . These are articles educational and informative in character."
(emphasis added) Lahiri v. Daily Mirror Inc., 162 N.Y. Misc. 776, 783, 295 N.Y.
Supp. 382, 389 (Sup. Ct. 1937). Yet, today the merit of this analysis is substantially
questioned. Exemplifying such doubt is one writer who, after discussing the Lahiri
case, stated: "It is submitted that public interest in such informational and educa-
tional articles should not be sufficient to extend immunity from liability to the publica-
tion of plaintiff's name or picture therein where plaintiff is not a public character."
(emphasis added) Note, 37 CoRNELL LQ. 502, 507 (1952). Thus the outdated public
figure concept is suggested as a strict limitation on educational and informational
material.
56. See Nizer, supra note 5, at 540.
57. Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1st Dept. 1920).
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of her story, accompanied by pictures, in a national magazine.58 The
use of a person's picture to exemplify the safe method of getting on
and off a street car was held legally actionable. 59 The Attorney General
of New York ruled, in an advisory opinion, that photographs of cancer
patients could not be displayed publicly by the department of health,
despite their "distinct social value for the general instruction and in-
formation of the public." 60 A doctor took photos of a patient which
portrayed the deformity caused by a particular infirmity and kept them
in his files "for future reasonable use for purposes of medical instruc-
tion"; the court found an invasion.61
The caesarian movies undoubtedly did constitute an invasion since
they were used for pornographic,62 rather than educational, purposes,
but the other four examples evidence varying degrees of judicial in-
eptitude in balancing of the interests involved. The fat woman case
is a close one, since the degree of personal embarrassment appears
to substantially offset the public benefit derived. The street-car-boarding
picture not only was of unquestioned educational value, but the degree
or character of invasion did not violate common decency. The feasibility
of obtaining a posed picture might explain the result, but the court
proffered no evidence of an awareness of this point.6 3 The unwillingness
to permit publication of cancer patients' photos despite the "distinct
social value" is inexplicable. Similarly baffling is the decision finding a
violation in the use of photos for medical instruction. Posing in the
latter two cases is, of course, impossible, and the educational value
unquestionable.
Here, again, as with the unrealistic fact-fiction analytical tool,
almost rudimentary analysis discloses the meagre judicial concern for
the proper function of the press in a democratic society. Clarified
recognition that a free press problem is involved would undoubtedly
58. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
59. Almind v. Sea Beach Ry., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N.Y. Supp. 842 (2d Dept.
1913).
60. N.Y. REP. An-'y. GEx. 374, 375 (1934).
61. 38 Pa. D. & C. Rep. 543, 547-548 (1940).
62. Cf. Semler v. Ultem Publications, Inc., 170 N.Y. Misc. 551, 9 N.Y.S.2d 319
(N.Y. City Ct. 1938). A professional model brought the action for publication of her
picture in defendant's Silk Stocking Stories magazine. Court held that since the
magazine appealed to sex, recovery should be allowed.
63. An additional factor must be considered when movies or photos are used in
the educational field. Undoubtedly the possibility of using a posed picture or one with
the identifying features obscured should be considered. See Lugwig, supra note 1, at
747.
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result in the accordance of that grave concern usually exhibited by
the courts in considering other challenges to the free press principle.64
IV
Inherent in the recent Supreme Court decision holding the moving
picture a part of the "press" 65 is an awareness that all forms of com-
munication fulfill an important role in furnishing an adequate press.66
Nevertheless, the courts are unmindful of this approach when excogitat-
ing the effect the media of communication should have in determining
the value in the publication of a particular subject-matter, erecting
thereby a third obstacle to full realization of the public's condigned
claim to be fully informed. Decisions reflect preconceived ideas as to
the value of certain media with the result that an article is viewed not
on its merits, but with unwarranted regard for the medium in which
it found expression. For instance, the courts have been impressed
with the fact that some media, notably the comic book,6 7 radio68 and
motion picture,69 are published with the hope of profiting because of
the amusing and entertaining content, while the publisher in other media
is said to seek only to inform the public. Although categorization of all
broadcasts heard over the radio during a day's time as amusement or
entertainment stretches credulity,7" assuming, arguendo, this can be
done, it does not necessarily follow that educational or informational
benefit will not be derived. 71 Manifestly, evaluation of the specific publi-
cation constitutes the only proper approach.
Since the report of factual current events is held in high regard,
the newspaper receives the most favorable treatment.72 However, the
privilege afforded news stories on the front page often seeps through
to protect items on other pages which should not and would not be
privileged if expressed in another medium.73  Of course, educational
64. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, 162 N.Y. Misc. 776, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
65. Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
66. See HOCKING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 162-163.
67. Moloney v. Boy Comics Publishers, 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st
Dept. 1950) (dissent).
68. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Calif. 1939).
69. Donahue v. Warner Bros., 192 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952); Binn v. Vitagraph
Corp. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108 (1913).
70. See HOCKING, op. cit. supra note 4, at 165.
71. See note 42 supra, and accompanying text.
72. See Nizer, .supra note 5, at 542.
73. In Colyer v. Fox, 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N.Y. Supp. 999 (2nd Dept. 1941), a
portrait of the plaintiff, a professional entertainer in the specialty of high diving, was
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and informational articles appear in newspapers, but consideration, as
a privileged publication, shou'ld be based solely on merit. Exemplifying
extreme application of customary practice, two New York cases found
that regardless of content, publication of any name or picture in a
single issue of a paper was not an invasion of privacy. 74
Furthermore, preconceived conceptions, while unduly favoring the
newspaper, have cast distrust upon other modes of communication.
Illustrative of the inability to discard prejudice towards various types
of publication are cases involving radio and motion pictures. Initially
even newsreels, because of the similarity to motion pictures, were skep-
tically regarded as a means of news presentation,7 5 although today
such incredulity has been dispelled.76 Yet motion pictures remain subject
to judicial disapprobation as a mode of disseminating informational and
educational matter .7 7 A recent comment approves of declaring "strictly
factual" reports an invasion when presented in a motion picture or
radio drama. "In such cases, the clear purpose of the presentation is
published in defendant's newspaper, The New York Police Gazette, together with four
other pictures of women vaudeville performers. All these pictures were grouped under
the title: "Five of a kind on this Page. Most of them adorned the Burlesque Stage; all
of them are favorites with the bald headed boys." The court ruled for the defendant.
undoubtedly impressed with the fact that the Gazette was a newspaper, at least in name.
The effect of publication within the pages of a newspaper is also evidenced by the
court's condonation of absurdly incorrect representations. The attribution to the plain-
tiff of a ridiculously incongruous heroic statement was not legally actionable, Jones v.
Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972 (1929). See also Thayer v. Worchester
Post -Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933), where a deliberate alteration was held
privileged where publication was made in a newspaper. A deleted photo of a woman
with her chauffeur was used in connection with a story of her husband's alienation of
affections actions against her. The photo had originally pictured the woman, her hus-
band, and two others as well as the chauffeur. A usual weighing of the interests in
these three illustrations should have produced decisions favorable to the plaintiffs.
74. McNulty v. Press Pub. Co., 136 N.Y. Misc. 833, 836, 241 N.Y. Supp. 29, 32
(Sup. Ct. 1930) ; Moser v. Press Pub. Co., 59 N.Y. Misc. 78, 109 N.Y. Supp. 963 (Sup.
Ct. 1908).
75. See Nizer, mpra note 5, at 544.
76. A newsreel taken of plaintiff, while plaintiff and police tried to solve a murder
mystery, was held not to be an invasion. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189
App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y. Supp. 752 (1st Dept. 1919). A motion picture newsreel pic-
turing corpulent women exercising to reduce was held not to be a violation. Sweenek
v. Pathe News, 16 F. Supp. 746 (D.C. 1936). But cf. Blumenthal v. Picture Classic,
235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y. Supp. 800, aff'd without opinion, 261 N.Y. 504, 185
N.E. 713 (1933). A sight seeing film depicting plaintiff selling bread on New York
streets was held to be an invasion.
77. The leading case involved the reconstruction of a ship wreck, featuring the
acts of the plaintiff, who was a wireless operator. Court declared an invasion, stating:
"The defendant used the plaintiff's alleged picture to amuse those who paid to be enter-
tained." Binn v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N.Y. 51, 103 N.E. 1108, 1111 (1913);
Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) (true past life of prostitute was
portrayed) ; Redmond v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 277 N.Y. 707, 14 N.E.2d 636 (1938)
(pictures of professional golfer's trick shot).
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to amuse rather than inform, and the immunity from liability is properly
withheld."78 This approach typifies an unwillingness to cope with the
real issues.
Emphasis on the purpose of the publisher has thus found accept-
ance in many cases, although some courts, by stressing the individual's
conscious purpose in viewing a movie or listening to a radio program,
have chosen a less undesirable means of evaluating the challenged pub-
lication.79 To meet the issue squarely, however, requires determining
whether the drama or movie does inform or educate; the motive of
the publisher, as well as that of the recipient, is immaterial. The basic
question-is the value of the movie or drama, when weighed in relation
to the individual harm, sufficient to permit publication without liability-
can most satisfactorily be resolved by disregarding the mode of
expression.
V
Two recent cases stand as examples of judicial success and failure
in this area of the law; embodied in one is approval of the invalid
analysis which harasses this field, while the other offers hope for a
rational solution.
Warner Brothers produced a motion picture depicting the life of
Jack Donahue, one of the immortals of show business, which incor-
porated some factual deviations. 80 In a suit based upon a Utah privacy
statute,"' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held for the
plaintiff, concluding that the statute8 2 "is content to forbid appropria-
tion . . . for purposes of trade, as distinguished from matters educa-
78. Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 504 (1952).
79. The Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, Inc., decision characterized the test
as, "one of frurpose, viewing the matter from the standpoint of the reaction of the
viewer rather than from the person who uses the plaintiff's name or likeness." 139
N.Y. Misc. 290, 292, 248 N.Y. Supp. 359, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
80. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952).
81. UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 103-4-8 (1943). These sections provide that anyone who
uses for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade the name, portrait or picture of
a person, if such person is living, without first having obtained the written consent of
such person, or, if such person is dead, without the written consent of his heirs or
personal representatives, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. The person whose name,
portrait or picture is used, or his heirs, may bring an action for damages. The Donahue
case was the first based on this statute.
82. The Utah and Virginia privacy statutes are based on the New York statute,
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52, under which much litigation has arisen. The N.Y. Act
was passed in 1903 to remedy the unpopular decision of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The Virginia statute is yet to be construed.
See Note, 38 VA. L. Rav. 117 (1952).
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tional, informative, or purely biographical in nature."83 "Purposes of
trade" 14 reflects judicial emphasis on the purpose of the publisher; the
fact therefore, that it was a motion picture appears to have borne con-
siderable weight. Admittedly such statutes are narrow in scope,8 5 but
the court should not attempt to broaden them by ignoring the funda-
mental free press limitation on the right of privacy. Furthermore, in
resting its decision on the stereotyped fact-fiction test, the court refused
to perceive that minor deviations of fact do not preclude educational
value in a biographical publication.
In the second case,8 6 plaintiff was the widely acclaimed hero bf a
plane crash in New York City. Several months later, a comic book
printed a true account of the entire episode with some very minor
factual deviations. The majority of the court, not impressed with
slight inaccuracies or with the contention that comic books are not
usually concerned with informative or educational material,, held that
there was no invasion. The minority was typically moved by irrelevant
considerations, as evidenced by the statement that "where the prime
purpose of the publication is amusement for trade purposes, as a matter
of law, the purpose is commercial." 7 Of course, not all or even a
sizeable proportion of comic books impart educational matter, but, as
this decision emphasizes, the governing factor is the value of the article
itself rather than the medium in which it is published.""
Judicial evolution of standards by which the courts seek to recon-
cile freedom of the press with the right to privacy has been attended by
an exaggerated concern for this comparatively new tort. Possibly the
83. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc., 194 F.2d 6, 13 (10th Cir. 1952).
84. See Nizer, supra note 5, at 547. These statutes, which afford recovery if the
publication is found to be published for "purposes of trade," add negligible assistance
to the court's determination of the particular case. Obviously, in our society, the pub-
lisher of almost every publication derives pecuniary benefits to some degree. The deci-
sion must, therefore, rest on other grounds, with the "purpose of trade" attached after
such result is reached.
85. These statutes limit the right of privacy to situations where publication of
name or likeness occurs. Other jurisdictions, recognizing this right on other grounds,
have broadened the right of privacy to include various other situations. Voelker v.
Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E.2d 548 (1947) (fingerprinting by police) (recovery denied) ;
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1932) (wire tapping); Engleman v.
Caldwell, 243 Ky. 23, 47 S.W.2d 971 (1932) (name calling).
86. Molony v. Boy Comics Publisher, Inc., 277 App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119
(1st Dept. 1950).
87. Id. at 173, 98 N.Y.S.2d at 126 (dissent).
88. Nevertheless the validity of the holding in Molony v. Boy Comics, Inc., 277
App. Div. 166, 98 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dept. 1950) is denied by one writer. "The mi-
nority holding, however, in considering the question of the medium of the publication
employed by the defendant seems to have reached the more logical conclusion." Note,
20 FoRD L. REv. 100 (1951).
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context in which the right originated, a journalistic era characterized by
extreme callousness for the feelings of the individual, accounts for the
continued overzealous protection of an individual's privacy. Certainly,
continued adherence to the fact-fiction concept, unwillingness to recog-
nize educational material, and emphasis on the purpose of the publisher
or the recipient cloud and confuse the proper determination of a given
publication's value. Accordingly, any attempt to achieve a judicious
balance between a free press and the right to be let alone would be
well served by discarding these concepts.8 Indeed, the tremendous
variety of fact situations suggests that the test should be broad and
possess a certain flexibility.90
DIMINISHING APPLICABILITY OF THE ANTITRUST
LAWS IN REGULATED INDUSTRY:
CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE AGENCIES
Members of commerce and industry have allegedly been plagued
with uncertainty as to their rights and liabilities under the Sherman
and Clayton Acts.1 This obscurity is at times even more prevalent in
segments of the economy which are also subject to regulation by federal
administrative agencies. Whereas the antitrust laws, which remain ap-
plicable in some degree to such industries, forbid restraints of trade by
various types of concerted activity and combinations of ownership which
result in undue economic power,2 several regulatory agencies have, either
89. "To determine in advance of experience the exact line at which the dignity
and convenience of the individual must yield to the demands of the public welfare
would be a difficult fask." Warren and Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214.
90. Implicit in any mechanical consideration of the problems involved is an un-
willingness to examine each case upon its own merits. Or as Mr. Justice Holmes
stated: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases
and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Dissent in Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384, at 391 (1911).
1. See Callman, The Essence of Antitrust, 49 CoL. L. REV. 1100 (1949); Handler,
Anti-trust-New Frontiers and New Perplexities, 6 REcoRn 59 (1951). But see
Bennett, Some Reflections on the Interpretation of the Sherman Act Since the EvIer-
gency, 8 FED. B.J. 317 (1947).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1946). The Clayton Act
was enacted to supplement the Sherman Act by halting practices tending toward re-
straint of trade or commerce. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1946) ; see EULER, MANUAL OF MONOPOLIES AND FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAws (1929).
Mere existence of a regulatory statute does not impliedly render inapplicable the
Sherman or Clayton Acts; the antitrust laws are superceded by specific statutes onl3
to the extent of repugnancy between the two. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S,
188, 198-199 (1939). An indictment charging a criminal violation of the antitrust law!
